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Summary 
The “environmental crisis” we experience today and the international community’s struggle 
to develop environmental standards to reach the epic “sustainable development” are widely 
known topics. What is needed, then, is an urgent and determined practice, which is only 
possible if international governance is structured, coherent and effective.  The optimization 
of Environmental Multilateralism (the joining of what are considered the “driving forces” of 
Environmental International Relations: Law, Politics and international Diplomacy) 
contributes greatly to this end. To understand its basic concepts and systems, as for 
example, its actors, negotiation and implementation of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) and the carrying out of their Regimes, as well as their development in 
the United Nations, these are all crucial elements for its improvement and optimization. The 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) and 
“its” Conventions are important examples in the history of Environmental Multilateralism, 
still very up-to-date not only due to the 20th anniversary of the “Rio Conference” but also 
due to the continuity and importance that the “Rio Conventions” and their Conferences of 
Parties (COP) still have.  This papers aims to analyze this area of studies transversal to 
International Relations and to the Environment, namely by studying the relation between 
the theory of Environmental Multilateralism and its practice1
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1. Introduction 
Though there are relevant examples of the urgency to solve environmental issues 
internationally since the end of the 19th century, only in the mid 20th century,  
specifically after the 60s, were there signs that Multilateralism would be implemented 
as an attempt to respond to a growing “environmental crisis” whose global dimension 
led to an obvious need for a coordinated action among all States.  In fact, and before 
this “new era” of Environmental Multilateralism, the Environment, and everything linked 
to it, was viewed as a local or regional issue. Only after the first (officially recognized) 
environmental degradations occurred due to the industrial revolution or globalization, 
did the problems of yesterday, which seemed to be limited in space and in 
consequences for the human being, started to have a transnational “status” and an 
increased importance.   
Multilateralism has been widely accepted as the modus operandi of international 
politics, namely of international environmental policy.  In fact, the last decades of 
international instability have made States realize that many contemporary challenges 
are too encompassing and too complex for any State alone; that even a group of States 
may not be able to face them alone. Among these global challenges whose 
management would be potentially easier through multilateral cooperation, many are 
environmental. The fact that no State can fight this battle alone is both beneficial and 
limiting: its actions together with other actions make it and the international fight 
stronger but its inactions or those of others may affect the cooperation chain. 
Meanwhile, we believe that for all, and regardless of their involvement, the 
Environment frequently "bumps" against more ambitious economic development 
policies which usually lead to more pollution or abuse of resources and exceeds the 
optimal which is sustainable development.   Besides this, there are still those who 
confuse “governance” with “government”, and are therefore afraid that multilateral 
actions may lead to a loss of State sovereignty.  
But there are answers to this and other criticism: issues related to bureaucracy may be 
simplified or resolved through adopting a more thorough model of multilateral 
measures and institutions. Similarly, international organizations and their bodies do not 
aim at "robbing" State sovereignty but to assist in attaining what no Nation can do 
alone; they do not aim to interfere with market economy but help to find mechanisms 
to make it more efficient and equal:  
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«… Multilateralism not only represents the most efficient, most effective, 
and most egalitarian approach to addressing global environmental 
issues, it is quite simply the only approach that brings with it the 
authority, legitimacy, and resources required to tackle so vast and 
complex problem…» (Powell, 2003:12). 
 
Therefore, it is obvious why, in the mid of about 700 Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements - MEA (Mitchell, 2002-2011, retrieved online), it is evident how crucial it is 
for Parties to converge and negotiate and, most importantly, to implement the MEAs in 
their national policies because only then can international norms be successful. 
Meanwhile, there is a variety of Actors, among which the United Nations (UN), pioneer 
and promoter of Environmental Multilateralism, as well as a number of States, 
institutions and governmental bodies, and different interests which make 
Multilateralism, complex in itself, even more extraordinary when linked to the 
environment. In fact, environmental issues are so huge and brutal that they are not 
measurable; thus, the difficulty of one solution or the success of an isolated measure. 
On the other hand, measures are rarely effective immediately or visibly and though the 
economic benefits from "sustainable development" have been proved, investment on 
clean energy, the management of waste and of resources, etc. does not lead to 
immediate (economic or environmental) return and not to "easy profit". Thus, the need 
to change the mindset of many involved. 
Currently, it has become more important to frame Environmental Multilateralism 
through understanding its evolution in the past decades, its main actors and 
institutions, how its processes have developed, how its achievements may be applied 
and optimized and, above all, understand what is wrong in this scenario and the means 
to improve it. Only then will it be possible to define an assertive way to face a crisis as 
huge as the environmental crisis.  
This is what fostered the interest in understanding the specificities and the 
development of Environmental Multilateralism within the scope of contemporary 
International Relations.  Simultaneously, it is obvious that this is an issue which does 
not seen to obtain the attention it deserves at national level. Further theoretical 
research would not only assist potential stakeholders as well as lead to more 
centralized studies on the role of Portugal in Environmental Multilateralism as well as on 
how "external boosts" influence Portuguese environmental policy. 
 
2. How Treaties are made: issues in (un)productivity? 
MEAs, because under the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 
have similar features to other international treaties. However, they are also different in 
that they are intergovernmental documents whose main objective is to prevent or 
manage human impact on natural resources. Thus, they are legally binding to countries 
that participate in it through ratification or accession, as well as to those who accept it 
through signing it because that in itself assumes an "official agreement" between the 
States and the MEAs. The former must abide to the latter or they will compromise the 
objectives of the MEAs.  Because they are not simply declarations of intent but tools of 
International Law, they should be viewed as valid and effective means to implement 
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policies whose objective is environmental protection and sustainable development. 
They should be used by the whole international community to carry out these 
assumptions (Dodds et al., 2007). 
Besides, and though they do not have an established structure, these tools have a 
number of specific features. In case of regulating regional or global environmental 
issues,  the framework partnership agreements are commonly adopted, which allows 
for a more encompassing and dynamic development of the tool through pre-defining 
and establishing a series of general obligations and procedures and adjusting  potential 
pre-agreements (Sands, 2009). In fact, most environmental treaties do not include 
specific, clear and detailed rules but rather a set of general principles and 
requirements, fostering participating States to overcome their lack of assertiveness and 
adopt all the adequate measures and mitigate environmental imbalances, namely 
through complementary tools to the development of the MEAs, in particular, Protocols.   
The advantage of regulating environmental imbalances this way, through framework 
partnership agreements and their regimes, is that its norms and standards may be 
easily changed or reinforced, according to the evolution of scientific knowledge or due 
to the need to adapt to new social and economic realities, among other reasons. In 
fact, not always have Protocols been given the credit they deserve in environmental 
standardization, since often it is the "Soft Law" (Resolutions, Declarations of Principle or 
Recommendations, etc.) which is responsible for providing "consistency" to too 
"encompassing" norms of environmental framework agreements. On the other hand, 
since the early stages of Environmental Multilateralism, it being "encompassing" is the 
reason for criticism by international public opinion, who increasingly use adjectives as 
"vague", without content", "abstract, etc. to describe the tools' too generic approach 
and consequent inability for action. However, is it condescending to view these tools 
and the whole process they are involved in light heartedly, i.e., listing all its faults and 
ignoring the difficulties they face? Kate O'Neill (2009), on this issue, stated that:  
 
«… The construction of international environmental treaty regimes rests 
on a complex process of bargaining and negotiation among nation states 
(…) States often have different, frequently conflicting interests around a 
particular issue area. They may not always trust their negotiating 
partners (…) or they may be unwilling to make concessions (…) 
Government representatives are concerned about domestic costs (…) 
Multiply all this factors by the number of states involved in negotiations, 
and it may seem surprising that any cooperative agreements are agreed 
upon in the first place…» (Kate O’Neill, 2009:81). 
 
Both before and after negotiations star, it is crucial that the "Treaty-making Process" is 
put in place, allowing for an organized and phased process and minimizing the typical 
impasses of MEA negotiation. There usually suffer delays, are sometimes put on hold 
and have their approval and application compromised. Thus, there are several 
measures that, if adopted, foster negotiations and prepare States from implementing 
the document such as: constant exchange of information between the Parties; 
systematic consultation in ongoing negotiation; workshops on how to implement the 
MEAs; institutional and ministerial coordination at national level; avoid overlaps and 
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encourage internal synergies involving existing MEAs (Bruch et al., 2006). However, 
and despite optimizing the treaty-making process, these measures by themselves do 
not solve all possible problems. As such, five examples will be provided of situations 
potentially damaging to good "Treaty-making Process", and which should be avoided as 
much as possible.  
The first situation is that in which there is no formal procedure which indicates how 
negotiations should be prepared by Party-States, i.e., an official document that may 
provide guidelines for governments on how to plan multilateral meetings around the 
MEAs, both "extraordinary" meetings (those that will result in new treaties) and 
"regular" meetings (such as most COPs).  
A second recurring situation which may damage the "Treaty-making Process" derives 
from lack of research to prove the need of that specific international tool, which means 
it is crucial that States include the environmental issue in their political agendas and 
those that join them also know the issue well. This lack is rather obvious. However, 
there have been situations in which more skeptical States or States more concerned 
with their national interests "boycotted" negotiations by means of presenting scientific 
opinions that best served their perspective and won over those opinions first presented.  
A third situation is linked to the approval of "drafts", this being the stage when 
negotiations usually get significantly delayed: discussions are often about the norms 
and/or the text to include and they may arise because of disagreement on an article's 
provisions and/or simple semantics.  
A fourth situation occurs in the context of decision-making, in the voting process, 
usually defined by Conventions, more specifically by the "Rules of Procedure for 
Meetings of the Conference of the Parties"i
The attempt to resolve confrontations in a consensus have been fairly successful: it is 
rather difficult to convince a State to internally apply a measure it does not agree with 
and which it did not support during the negotiations; on the other hand, the fact that 
some States are more influential when what is at stake is to persuade undecided 
parties makes consensus in Environmental Multilateralism decision-making extremely 
ambiguous and subject to much criticism. However, and as Kate O'Neill (2009) states, 
there is nothing like a "good (environmental) crisis" for States to gather strength to 
solve a common problem. Yet, we believe that this type of "pressure", namely when 
over the top, may not always lead to positive results; in fact, in the "rush" to get good 
results, certain issues may be left unresolved for which a solution is never found. This 
may damage environmental preservation and sustainability. 
. In general, the decision-making process in 
MEA negotiations follows the "Principle of Consensus", in practice, somewhere between 
"unanimity", allowing all Parties the right to reject a decision, and "qualified majority", 
no requiring a positive vote from all Parties involved. Besides, decisions are not usually 
made through quality vote by through gradual removal of objections to certain details 
in the treaty's draft, thus making the agreement stronger and more difficult to oppose 
to, mainly because the "indifferent" Parties, i.e., those who had not yet expressed for 
or against it, tend to accept the final result and reinforce its support (Gehring, 2008).  
Finally, a fifth situation, not always considered but relevant to the good performance of 
any "Treaty-making Process": that Delegation remain in the negotiations. In fact, «… 
States often rotate negotiators. This means that no one really has a complete picture of 
what happened in previous negotiations or necessarily understands the broader context 
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and history of issues currently under discussion…» (Bruch et al., 2006:88). Attention 
should be given to avoid changes in national Delegations and ensure their continuity, 
effectiveness and strength.  However, when that occurs due to government changes 
and, therefore, inevitable, there are alternatives which may assist in Delegation 
transition, namely the implementation of a platform where all relevant information to 
Environmental Multilateralism may be archived and organized and be of use to 
negotiators, other ministerial authorities and Actors involved. Furthermore, it may be 
used as database for the general public and to academicsii
Meanwhile, during environmental Regimes two contradictory features have emerged 
that still confuse some reference authors: on the one hand, these include a sui generis 
institutional element that allows Parties to constantly adjust to new circumstances and 
obligations, as well as to supervise and react to possible failure to carry out agreement 
or to insufficient implementation; on the other hand, the development of Environmental 
International Law evidences «… the fragmentation of the institutional setting from 
which it emerges…» (Gehring, 2008: 495), as the Parties seem to prefer to establish 
new “treaty systems” instead of including new norms to already existing systems, 
causing a “boom” of MEAs, often counterproductive in terms of the international 
community and in terms of the Environment.   
.  
 
3. The boom of Environmental Multilateralism Agreements  
Considering some of the data collected at online databases, we may realize that 
Environmental Multilateralism has gained popularity in the past decades, at least in 
terms of the adoption of Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Yet, is this 
development really noteworthy? In fact, and according to reference authors, this 
development has experienced “negotiation fatigue” (Kanie, 2007: 74), “treaty 
congestion” (Sand, 2008: 39) or “summit fatigue” (O’Neill, 2009: 5). Many of the 
negative aspects can jeopardize potential positive ones. 
In fact, the current MEA system has some advantages, for example, that advocated by 
those who believe that complex issues as those of the environment are best handled 
using a wide, fragmented and decentralized system. This way, information may be 
transmitted and functions are rather redundant, preventing the inactivity of one 
institution from jeopardizing the whole system. Furthermore, with problem solving 
specialization, solution will be tailor-made and, as a consequence, optimized. Finally, a 
diffuse MEA system may allow its secretariats the flexibility needed for creativity and 
innovation (Kanie, 2007). 
However, the accuracy and functionality of the above mentioned pre-eminences may be 
rather debatable and ambiguous. For example, it is clear that the more individualized a 
problem is, the easier and optimized its solution will be. Yet, we may not forget that 
environmental issues, as well as the existing MEAs, are transversal. Therefore, it is 
almost impossible to believe that for environmental issues there will be "tailor-made 
solutions". On the one hand, there is an obvious need of centralized solutions, on the 
other, these must be part of a strategic and transversal plan that encompasses several 
issues and their Conventions. 
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Figure 1 - The boom of MEAs: number of MEAs and Amendments between 1950 and 
2011 
Source: adapted from Mitchell, 2002-2011, retrieved online 
 
It is precisely this lack of coordination that may be viewed as one of the negative 
aspects of the "boom" of current MEA system. On this issue, Kanie (2007) refers to the 
lack of «… coordinated and synergistic approach to solving common problems…» 
(Kanie, 2007:74), as well as unnecessary duplication of rules and inconsistent 
objectives.  In fact, the proliferation of MEAs, and a consequently too wide system and 
excess number of secretariats with low coordinating authority, leads to the already 
mentioned treaty congestion and to an institutional and political work that is 
incoherent, confuse and repetitive. Thus, if "redundancy" may have positive effects 
because it avoids the "ripple effect" when an institution becomes dysfunctional, this 
may also cause MEAs, or, in extreme cases, a great part of the system, to become 
inefficient (Kanie, 2007).  
Therefore, and in regards to the disproportionate and somewhat uncontrolled increase 
in Multilateral Environmental Agreements, there are different opinions on what could 
improve the MEA system today. In fact, and no matter the many mistakes made along 
the way, i.e. since the mid 20th century up to now, we must no forget that only 
recently were environmental issues no longer "unknown territory". As such, the 
international community knew little of their resolution, let alone that the MEA system 
should be more concise and transversal or wider and more "tailor-made".  Only now are 
the first steps being taken to adapt Environmental Multilateralism to complex and 
unpredictable variants as environmental issues and the world we live in.  
 
4. National Implementation 
That being said, a question arises: in practical terms, how efficient are MEAs and their 
Regimes? On the one hand, the negotiation and adoption of an international treaty, 
whether long or short, complex or simple, may simply "fall down" when the agreed 
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measures are transposed to national legislation or when objectives are met by each 
State; on the other hand, if almost two hundred States coming to an agreement is 
extremely complex, the more so it is to apply what was agreed upon.  
 
«… the mere fact that certain states have become parties to a treaty 
committing them to take measures to deal with some environmental 
problem does not per se ensure, or even necessarily promote, 
harmonization of national law (…) states will often have considerable 
discretion in the methods of implementation they use, and possibly also 
in the standards and timetables they set (…) They may all be working to 
the same goal, but doing so in very different ways…» (Birnie et al., 
2009:10). 
 
Therefore, so that national implementation is complete and fruitful, this work should be 
started at the beginning of the negotiations, making the adoption and ratification of 
measures as swift as possible and avoiding difficulties in adapting then to national 
legislation and function. However, there are other considerations to bear in mind at this 
critical moment of the MEAs, for example through previous revision and definition of 
the Focal Pointiii
Another crucial situation in MEA implementation process, in legal terms, occurs in the 
preparation of implementation programs and frameworks, which hopefully will «… 
deter, punish and redress violations…» (UNEP, 2006: 194), and which should be fully 
followed not only but especially by State bodies and agencies so as to set a "good 
example". Meanwhile, for a fruitful national implementation, the following should be 
taken into account: situations such as skills development and technology transfer 
(crucial mainly to developing countries and economies in transition); the involvement of 
the main interested parties, such as NGOs, the Private Sector, local communities, the 
use of the media to raise public awareness. In fact, many times legal measures are 
considered the only ones with the power to attain results, which is somewhat true; in 
practice, the law allows for more measurable results. Yet, we must not forget that 
these are negligible measures without a secure a cohesive support.  
of the treaty. These should be well prepared, both in terms of 
administrative resources as well as in terms of the authority to implement them. In this 
context, cooperation and coordination of governmental institutions are crucial; there 
should permanent team work to implement the MEA in a fair and transversal way. 
Furthermore, Governments should also be prepared to possible restrictions, common in 
the first stage of implementation. As such, they should always have a plan which will 
allow them to solve eventual problems within a specific period. States are usually 
fostered to design National Implementation Plans. 
Finally, there is another crucial item in national implementation of multilateral 
measures and commitments which deserve attention: MEA, for example, encompass a 
series of «… specific prohibitions, which states are required to implement through the 
application of specific ‘measures’, but to leave the method and means to the state…» 
(Redgwell, 2008:940), i.e., the "obligations" agreed upon by the Parties are usually 
concerned with results obtained and not with the whole process of implementing those 
results, which does not allow equality of the latter and hinders success of the former.   
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Therefore, there are some who question MEA and Environmental Multilateralism 
counter productivity: can you expect better results than those achieved so far or will 
they always depend on the sensitivity, good will and even the "mood" of States? In 
fact, in the current scenario, the answer will inevitably be affirmative; yet, if the 
historical evolution of MEA national implementation is taken into account, a progress is 
visible which may well be the motto for future changes: 
 
«… The first generation of international environmental treaties rarely 
provided for any degree of monitoring or oversight of national 
implementation. Increasingly, however, modern environmental treaties 
provide for a comprehensive feedback loop, from implementation, to 
monitoring, to reporting, to international review, and to non-compliance 
mechanisms (…) Under many recent international environmental 
agreements, states parties not only have the obligation to implement, 
but also have an express obligation to report upon such 
implementation…» (Redgwell, 2008: 941, onwards.). 
 
5. The Reform of UN Environmental System  
The institutional structure of the UN for the Environment contrasts with other 
international governing systems, such as those on Health or Commerce. In fact, and 
though in this case competences are  allocated in a more or less wide institutional 
structure, therefore not always efficient, organized and optimal, experts' opinions on 
the lack of centralization and coordination in terms of international environmental 
governing, namely that of the UN, is very clear:  
 
«…the institutional architecture for the environment lacks clarity and 
coherence. No one organization has been able to emerge as a leader to 
actively champion environmental issues ensuring their integration within 
economic and social policies. International environmental responsibilities 
and activities are spread across multiple organizations, including (…) 
(UNEP), numerous other UN agencies, the international financing 
institutions, and the World Trade Organization. Adding to this tapestry 
are the independent secretariats and governing bodies of the numerous 
international environmental treaties…» (Ivanova et al., 2007: 48).    
 
In fact, the UN includes and is responsible for the management of several bodies with 
different competences in Environmental Multilateralism. It is obvious that, depending 
on their involvement in terms of the environment, they may receive more or less focus. 
The one that stands out is the United Nations Programme for the Environment - UNEP. 
Though it was initially expected that it would be a catalyst in environmental 
development and coordination within the UN, its limited resources and autonomy did 
not allow it to fully fulfil the task. However, the creation of other bodies, such as the 
Commission on Sustainable Development (DCS) and the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) (the latter is not part of the UN system but it is directly linked to its main 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 3, n.º 2 (fall 2012), pp. 87-102    
International Relations and the environment: practical examples of environmental multilateralism 
Filipa Tiago Gomes 
 96 
 
environmental bodies), as well as the competences other bodies acquired, resulted in a 
"competition" and in two of the major issues within the UN environmental system: an 
overlapping or multiplication of competences and responsibilities, together with a 
significant decrease in UNEP influence.  
 
Figure 2 – UN and UNEP Environmental System 
Sources: adapted from http://www.un.org e http://www.unep.org 
 
Considering this, it is remarkable how UNEP competences were expanded so as to 
develop Internacional Environmental Law, having become supervisor of bodies 
responsible for daily running environmental regimes and a home to several MEAs and 
their secretariats. However, there is more and more evidence that the latter have 
become more autonomous in developing and managing their specific areas, relations 
and probable overlaps, which must be  «… inevitably emerged in the complex and 
piecemeal system of global environmental governance that currently dominates 
international environmental politics…» (Jinnah, 2008, quoted by O’Neill, 2009: 
56),which will again weaken UNEP competences. 
The first references to a reform of UNEP and a restructuring of international 
environmental governance appear in this context. Though not recent (the issue was 
already discussed in the "Rio Conference" in 1992), the "solutions" resulted merely in 
the creation of CSD and, later, in extending the mandate of the Program and the 
creation of the Global Ministerial Environment Forum.  
Thus, and while criticism is being made, such as «…the large number of bodies involved 
with environmental work has (…) increased fragmentation and resulted in 
uncoordinated approaches in both policy development and implementation. This lack of 
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coherence in the system has “placed a heavy burden on all countries as well on 
international organizations…» (Berruga and Maurer, quoted by Ivanova, 2007: 54), or 
«… Protagonists rightly point to fragmentation of existing structures, the relative 
weakness of UNEP as the principal UN body with general environmental competence, 
and the powerful focus the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO bring to economic 
development…» (Birnie et al., 2009: 69). Different and more or less grandiose 
proposals have been put forth, such as the merger of environmental institutions and 
treaties in a "mega forum" with decision-making and executing powers, which would 
issue agreements ruling international environmental governance, or that UNEP would 
be "promoted" to UN "Specialized Agency". However, there are others who consider 
that, since the UN system does not work through "institutional manipulation", one of its 
bodies with environmental competences cannot monopolize a specialized area, nor 
could it take over competences from other "Specialized Agencies". Furthermore, other 
believe it is not true that MEA coordination, negotiation and revision is easier or more 
successful if led by a hypothetical environmental agency or organization.   
Regardless of the point of view, it is impossible not to consider the need for new 
solutions for UN environmental governance and there could be no better example of it 
the continuous environmental degradation. In view of this "environmental crisis", the 
action's practicality and success must depend on a specific strategy and planning, 
which in turn results from a coherent international governance, which is not always 
what happens today.  Yet, is the solution that advocated by those "for the new 
environmental organization/agency?". This, we believe, will be answered in time. 
Meanwhile, we must consider the necessary "changes" for international environmental 
institutions and governance to obtain more and better results.  
 
6. Final Considerations 
There is much to write and discuss on Environmental Multilateralism: from basic 
concepts such as who are its Actors and institutions, what can be understood by 
Regimes and Treaty-making Process, the role of Conventions and their Protocols and 
the so-called "Soft Law" in the environmental issue; to more complex questions, such 
as if Internacional Environmental Law is not just a branch of Internacional Law per si or 
if it can be viewed as a separate type of Law, different from other "international laws", 
as Human Rights, and, in this sense, its importance in Environmental Multilateralism 
may be the same or higher than that of Eco-politics and Diplomacy.  
All this leads to questioning how Environmental Multilateralism is viewed, which should 
be as a transversal and twofold issue: on the one hand, Internacional Environmental 
Law must be acknowledged as the main "ruler" in the environmental problem, 
considering that, though there no real "international legislation", there is, in practice, a 
complex "legislative process" which includes several sources of Internacional Law, from 
which new laws are issued and others updated, which must be respected and complied 
to by the whole international community. On the other hand, a series of International 
organizations and their institutions, some Non-Governmental Organizations, Diplomatic 
Conferences, regular or extraordinary, and the MEAs (which include treaties and their 
regimes) are all part of this process; above all this, about two hundred States, with 
different features and environmental interests but with the mission to develop political 
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agendas and discussion forums as well as negotiations appealing to all (Birnie et al., 
2009).  
In this context, it is not surprising that the "legislative process" is widely considered as 
essentially political, as it mostly "legislates" through diplomatic means instead of the 
usual work carried out by legal experts and institutions. Therefore, and though 
Internacional Law is crucial in the development of environmental legislation, this is 
mostly the result of political and diplomatic decisions imposed by the international 
community, from which often derive tools with vague content and with few effective 
rules which will lead States into acting coherently. On the other hand, «… periodic 
meetings of the parties to multilateral treaties (…) constitute ‘ongoing, interactional 
processes’, and that ‘It is this boarder process and not the formal act of consent that 
infuses the legal norms generated within with the ability to influence state conduct’…» 
(Brunnée et al., quoted by Birnie et al., 2009: 45), i.e., it is precisely this "political-
diplomatic" legislative process that fosters States to act and not exactly the fact that 
they signed this or that tool of International Law.    
Thus, we may conclude that the problem does not necessarily derive from vague MEAs, 
as, for example, environmental Framework-Agreements are usually described; these 
evidence the aims of the Parties in the agreement, which rather makes the problem 
even more complex. If, when negotiating a new tool, a State is not motivated or is 
simply interested in imposing interests not related to the Environment, then its 
contribution to the agreement will be null. Meanwhile, negotiations being over and a 
new treaty adopted, you cannot expect that initially demotivated State to have simply 
changed its perspective and commitment; most probably it will have accepted to be a 
"Party" and draw "diplomatic benefits" from it but it will not necessarily make its 
development easy or strictly abide to its implementation. Therefore, the "vague" tool 
allows this and other States to progress as they had wished, taking full advantage of 
Multilateralism which sees international cooperation and a procedure evolving through 
consensus but does not allow  room for maneuver to others whose strategies in their 
environmental agendas are "ambition" and "commitment". This is a perverse process 
which does not only weaken the MEAs and their actions but also directly influences 
issues related to Environmental Multilateralism, such as the treaty-making process 
making it longer and eroding its credibility.  
The weakness of bodies such as UNEP and CSD, which are supposed to have 
institutional and legal influences substantially higher than those granted to them today, 
is another huge flaw in the international environmental system, in particular of the UN. 
It is true that the separation of these two bodies within the environment does justice to 
the progress in terms of intervention since the 1970s and 90s. However, they are still 
far from being able to fully design and implement an ambitious strategic plan which the 
Environment and Environmental Multilateralism so urgently require, especially in 
today's scenario. The fact that both UNEP and CSD report to ECOSOC instead of directly 
to UNGA is, in itself, a sign of these bodies' weakness. Most critics of this system state 
that their "voices" are notoriously limited, the more so in the case of UNEP, because of 
its status as "Program" rather than "Specialized Agency", with all the additional 
disadvantages that poses to it. 
But the main flaw - which ultimately influences the ones I have mentioned and others - 
is without a doubt the lack of coordination and coherence the institutional system 
designed for the Environment has been labeled and rightly so. In fact, the analysis to 
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the UN environmental system demonstrates it: a huge number of MEA, often resulting 
in a new Regime, innumerous Actors (and within them several UN bodies), all having 
some competences, objectives or mandate, with more or less scope and autonomy in 
the different environmental issues. 
Therefore, and despite the attempts to restructure international environmental 
governance in the last two decades, progress has been limited; noteworthy is that  «… 
while governance discussions continued, they were never explicitly on the political 
agenda…» (Ivanova, 2011: 5), which has made this a real and concerning issue to the 
international community, in practice a "ghost" problem.  In fact, only recently did a 
political opportunity open up to restructure the international institutional framework for 
the Environment, namely through United Nations Conference for Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20 Conference), which was held in Rio de Janeiro, precisely 20 
years after the first Rio conference. One of the conference's highlights was the item 
"Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development" which focused on two very 
important points which, if put into practice, could completely change the international 
environmental governance framework: changing CSD into a council for Sustainable 
Development, which would be «…authoritative, high-level body for consideration of 
matters relating to the integration of the three pillars of sustainable development…» 
(UNCSD, 2012:9), or, from a more ambitious perspective, «… to establish a UN 
specialized agency for the environment with universal membership of its Governing 
Council, based on UNEP, with a revised and strengthened mandate (…) on an equal 
footing with other UN specialized agencies…» (my emphasis) (UNCSD, 2012: 10).  
Expectations were temporarily focused on the results from the "RIO+20 Conference", 
whether bold or worthless, as «…even a decision for no reform will have enduring 
consequences and will shape the actions of the global community over the next twenty 
years…» (Ivanova, 2011: 5). However, the meeting seemed, from the start, to be 
destined to limited progress, especially after the launching of “Rio+20 Zero Draft – The 
Future We Want” (10 January 2012), which gave origin to a series of prognoses, mostly 
insignificant. Though some potential had been attributed to the meeting, most critics 
identified flaws in the "Zero Draft". In some cases, these flaws were rather alarming, 
which evidenced, on the one hand, the expectations on the Conference and, on the 
other, the fear of it being unsuccessful. Besides this, "Zero Draft" led to opinions being 
expressed by States and for it to become a delicate situation, for example, on the 
updating of UNEP status as UN "specialized Agency", the US stated that they would 
rather  «… avoid the distraction of trying to set up something new and untested…» 
(Duyck, 2012, retrieved online), while India declared that «…elevating UNEP to the 
status of a UNEO or a specialized environmental agency, would give disproportionate 
weight to the environmental pillar of sustainable development…» (Duyck, 2012, 
retrieved online). This was and still is the only one of three officially not represented by 
an international organization or agency. 
Thus, and though many wanted to believe that the doom-and-gloom forecasts could be 
turned around in the final hours before the Conference agreement - which would not be 
a first - the results widely met the negative expectations. Despite many opted for 
stating that "it was better something than nothing at all", most were not convinced.  It 
is obvious that restructuring the UN environmental institutional framework was not, in 
itself, a panacea but it would undoubtedly be an extremely important development, 
without which future successes of international environmental governance would be 
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very difficult if not impossible. Thus, consensus in promoting CSD into a Council for 
Sustainable Development, though small progress, seems "nothing" when compared to 
what could have been achieved, while the plunging number of initial articles in the 
"Draft" of the final agreement proved that skeptics of Environmental Multilateralism 
were right. 
We do not yet know what to expect from International Relations and the Environment 
and of international environmental governance. Now that the Conference, which was 
seen as a turning point, is over, international community is at a deadlock. Is 
Environmental Multilateralism as we know it strong enough to face an increasing 
"environmental crisis" and to more and more concerning social and economic 
scenarios? Will States have the judgment necessary to continue to respect international 
environmental governance without institutional changes being implemented that would 
make it stronger and more cohesive? In fact, we believe the real solution lies in 
governmental intervention at the highest level: those in power should legislate and 
ensure their national programs are developed and implemented in accordance with 
environmental objectives agreed upon by the international community in general and 
the United Nations in particular. Those in power are also responsible for proceeding, 
unafraid of "diplomatic crises" or offending sensibilities, with effective and coherent 
multilateral measures which become more than promises sealed with an applause. We 
must reach a consensus, indeed, so that all may apply what they agree on and 
understand. Yet, most importantly, the economic interests and/or selfishness of some 
Nations cannot be allowed to boycott negotiation after negotiation, in which often the 
convenience of the few overrides the well-being of many. 
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i  See, for example, the “Rules of Procedure” of the Convention on Bio logical Diversity: 
http://www.cbd. int/doc/ legal/cbd-ru les-procedure.pdf.  
ii  There are already a few models which could be adapted to national and/or regional scenarios: the “Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin” (http://www.iisd.ca/voltoc.html), where there is a good amount of documents 
linked to Environmental Multilateralism available, or other sites, such as the “Environmental Treaties 
and Resource Indicators” (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri/index.jsp) or the “IEA – Database 
Project” (http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?file=home.htm&query=static).  
iii Focal Point, or National Focal Points, are environmental bodies, represented by people and appointed by 
national Governments, which are the main liaison between the State and the MEA Secretariat. For 
example, in regards to the “Rio Conventions”, the Portuguese “Focal Points” include ICNB, the 
Committee on Climate Change (Comité Executivo da Comissão para as Alterações Climáticas-CECAC), 
the Department on Climate Change, Air and Noise (Departamento de Alterações Climáticas, Ar e Ruído-
DACAR), and the Ministry of  Agriculture (see http://www.cbd.int/doc/lists/nfp-cbd.pdf; 
http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/nfp.pl; http://www.unccd.int/focalpoints/focalpoints.php). 
